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COMMITMENT TO AND
IN MARRIAGEt
LEON SALZMAN, M.D.*
The ability to enter into contractual relationships, whether they be in
the form of a business arrangement to buy or sell things or a human living
arrangement such as marriage or church membership, depends upon a
number of issues. Initially, there must be the capacity in both parties for
making a free choice and decision even if the external cultural conditions
may prearrange such a contract. In order to make such a decision the
individual must have the intellectual and cognitive capacity to understand
the terms and the nature of the contract into which he is entering. In
marital contracts the existence of manifest feeblemindedness, brain dam-
age with total confusion, and disorientation and severe mental disorder
with delusions and hallucinations clearly invalidates the ceremony.
Secondly, there must be some measure of ability to comprehend and
be responsible for carrying out the contractual relationship, including some
awareness of the implications of the arrangement and the ability to project
into the future the complications and issues that may develop. In a busi-
ness arrangement such issues can be fairly well accounted for in terms of
such things as weather conditions or technical consultations. In a contract
such as marriage, involving interpersonal intimacy, however, future com-
plications relating to, among other things, family occupation or accidental
or physical events are more difficult and complicated and involve more
than an intellectual projection into the future. In human relationships the
presence of emotions, feelings, love, tenderness, anger, hate, and envy, for
example, play a crucial role in the initial decision as well as the ability and
willingness of the partners to fulfill the contractual agreement.
Consequently, in dealing with the question of whether human contracts
might be considered valid at the time of the exchange of consent as well
as in the ensuing hours and years, one must take into account not only the
intellectual or cognitive capacities of the individuals involved, but also
their emotional and psychic integrity. Also the degree to which their emo-
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tional maturity allows for a sincere understanding of another person's
needs, desires, sensitivities, and values must be considered.
To adequately examine the question we must look at the following
issues. Time permits us to go into detail with only a few. First, what
emotional and intellectual faculties limit, distort, and negate an individ-
ual's freedom of choice and freedom to act? I shall only examine the emo-
tional factors that play a significant role in these matters. Second, what
constitutes maturity to enter into valid interpersonal relationships in
which love, concern, and responsibility for others is present? Third, can
psychiatry supply some guidelines and judgments in matters of emotional
and psychic maturity? Fourth, do the present psychiatric categories and
labels adequately identify unequivocally those who can and those who
cannot fulfill the criteria of a valid marriage contract? In this matter, do
the categories of psychosis and neurosis define more severe and less severe
personality disorganization so that the presence of either label will imme-
diately enable one to make a judgment with respect to validity? In fact,
some neuroses may be more disorganizing and therefore more disruptive
to an individual's ability to enter into valid contracts than a psychosis.
This is particularly relevant to one category of character disorders which
will be examined in some detail. Fifth, can the psychiatric consultant, on
the basis of a present examination of the individual, documents, and wit-
nesses, evaluate and affirm the emotional and contractual capacity of an
individual many years in the past? And finally, can this be done in a brief
period of time without elaborate testing, interviewing, and prolonged ex-
amination? I propose to respond briefly to these questions.
CHOICE-DECISION-COMMITMENT
The ability to make a decision or to choose between alternatives is
dependent on a number of significant and related factors in human func-
tioning. An intellectual awareness of the issue and an ability to discrimi-
nate between alternatives after an examination of relevant factors is ob-
viously essential to decisionmaking. After acknowledging this obvious
statement, however, we must recognize that emotional factors are strong
determinants as to whether a decision can be made and what the decision
will be. Often this is so in spite of the facts and data that are accumulated.
Frequently decisions are not made because the individual is emotion-
ally incapable of closure insisting that he must have more and more data
about his intended spouse and thereby allowing only accidental factors to
force the issue. This we can call a decision by default because circumstan-
ces, and not inner commitment, finally decree the matter. Emotional fac-
tors may also contrariwise, impulsively bring about a decision in order to
mitigate the anxieties of procrastination and indecision. Such decisions are
not made freely, but derive from hidden forces of fear; uncertainties; and
demands for perfection, absoluteness, and guarantees for the future. Thus
the consideration of alternatives in an intellectual sense and the ability to
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make commitments and decisions are strongly influenced by one's feelings,
attitudes, and emotional state and particularly by the kind of personality
structure one has developed through the years. This is not the same issue
we see in psychotic states where delusional ideas or commands may push
an individual to commitments that are totally alien to his true person or
to his more normal or healthy orientation. Nevertheless, they are closely
related in that they involve compulsive behavior produced by inner dic-
tates that we cannot alter or disregard, but which can be alleviated by
psychiatric treatment. This matter has been clearly understood for centu-
ries and is recognized in the category of psychoses as schizophrenia or
manic-depressive disorders.
The recognition that one's characteristic mode of functioning, what we
call personality or character structure, has a crucial influence on decision-
making and can seriously affect one's free will, judgment, and capacity for
love, intimacy, and concern for another human being must be taken into
account. Such decisions by these particular characterological types are
made beyond and outside the individual's conscious and deliberate choice
because they are forced on him by psychological and internal imperatives.
For example, an hysterical personality tends to be impulsive, tends to
make decisions on strong emotional grounds rather than on intellectual
appraisals and, because of both a great necessity for immediate closure and
the uneasiness of any waiting period, tends to make premature judgments.
In their great need for dramatic and flashy effects, a decision grows out of
the immediate need rather than an examination of long term effects.
Likewise, the pathologically greedy person, someone who has a com-
pulsive need to take all the time and cannot turn down a possibility if it
offers any degree of satisfaction, must also be considered. His decision fails
to take into account the negative features of a situation and is often faulty
or invalid. The obsessive or compulsive individual most strikingly illus-
trates this point since he cannot make a choice in spite of having examined
all the alternatives over and over again and having reviewed every issue a
number of times and in great detail. Such decisions and commitments are
impossible for him to make because of his need for absolute guarantees and
certainties regarding the consequences of his decisions. As a result, these
individuals are forced to make decisions impulsively or only when external
factors compel them to overcome the enormous anxieties implicit in mak-
ing the wrong choice. When such decisions turn out to be wrong they
cannot accept the responsibility for them since they must insist that the
decision was forced on them by others. Thus, every decision is a condi-
tional one, lacking full commitment and resolution and rarely based on
positive issues of love, intimacy, or care.
The pathologically dependent or passive individual may decide when
he feels he will get support and maternal care, not when there is a mutual
relationship of growing and getting. Some decisions for marriage are expe-
dient or exploitative and, in the sociopathic or psychopathic personality,
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may be fraudulently committed in order to achieve some personal gain
without a real regard for the partner. These examples give us some idea of
how one's background and development, producing a particular personal-
ity deformation, heavily influence a decision and frequently in a direction
that does not convey a free choice or an ability to examine fully or wisely
the issues or the alternatives even though the individual's intellectual
capacities are intact.
In severe compulsive personality disorders or neuroses no full choice
or will is present since the possibility of exerting choice is eliminated by
the strength of the compulsion which forces the individual to choose in one
direction or another without a valid consideration of the alternatives. This
issue can be seen in all forms of compulsive behavior, whether it be com-
pulsive scrupulosity, drinking, stealing, or eating. In the compulsion neu-
roses an individual is forced to behave in certain ways or to obsess over
ideas or words which he cannot turn off because of the enormity of the
underlying psychological demands. In this personality structure or neu-
rosis we have the clearest evidence of behavior dictated by forces outside
of the individual's awareness and control. He therefore has no freedom to
choose since he cannot examine the underlying pressures that force him
to behave as he does. He does, however, explain or rationalize his behavior.
It is beyond his capacity to control unless he receives adequate and compe-
tent therapy for this fascinating but debilitating psychic disorder. Over-
scrupulosity is a manifest symptom of this disorder in the realm of religious
practice.
If the decision to marry derives from sources related to what has been
described, we can readily see that the commitment to such a marriage is
fragile and exceedingly vulnerable to early disruption unless fortuitous
circumstances intervene and sufficient healing occurs.
Decision with regard to marriage may also be psychologically invalid
if at the moment of choice the individual was temporarily incapable of a
free choice because of drugs, alcohol, trauma, and the like. These may not
imply a character disorder or psychosis, but a temporary state in which the
ability to decide is impaired.
Thus, in all of the above instances, the elements of psychic and emo-
tional immaturity interfere with judgmental capacity. Since a free or ma-
ture decision or choice does not derive from two independent activities and
capacities, namely the intellect and the emotions, but actually must be a
synthesis of the two, that is to say the consequence of integrated, not
separated or independent, judgments, we cannot say that a decision was
correct simply because the individual's intellectual capacities were ade-
quate. Rather, only the unity and the maturity of the aspects of the emo-
tions and the intellect will permit the psychiatrist to assert that such
decisions come from a free and untroubled state and represent the valid
wishes of the involved parties.
Although it is extremely difficult to assess whether such a synthesis
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does in fact exist in a particular individual at a particular time, the
developments in psychology and medicine in the last century have ad-
vanced our understanding of the structure of the human psyche and the
way it functions to allow us to make reasonable judgments as to whether
some decisions have come out of an integrated ego structure or whether
they have been forced by compulsions or other psychic abnormalities.
When we have certain psychic states, like compulsions, or a severity of
problems, as in the psychosis of the borderline state, the decision is easy.
But in the borderlands of certain character structures or neuroses, we still
need a clear and competent investigation to judge the individual's capacity
to make a free and mature choice.
The ability to comprehend an individuals' personality structure in
order to come to some judgment about his capacity for mature decision-
making does not require prolonged or extensive interviewing. In fact, a
good psychiatric interview lasting one or two hours, accompanied by sup-
porting materials from other members of the family, relatives, or friends,
can often give one a firm grasp about the individual's capacity to make
mature judgments free from compulsive tendencies and emotionally and
intellectually considered. In the borderline states this may be slightly more
complicated, but the same issue prevails when we have sufficient evidence
of a personality disorganization bordering on psychotic tendencies or po-
tentialities for disorganized thinking or acting. In fact the label of border-
line indicates some latent potentiality for schizophrenic development that
suggests a severe psychological incapacity.
To come to such judgments does not necessarily require us always to
have a perfect and total picture of the syndrome. Even if we have a great
deal of time, it is not possible to have a complete picture in all instances
since no one individual displays all the elements in one personality struc-
ture or psychotic or neurotic disorder. What we need is sufficient and
essential features that characterize the disorder; we can extrapolate on the
rest with some caution.
How do we know that the personality that is now being presented to
us operated at the time of the decision to marry? It is extraordinary how
personality does reveal itself if the interview techniques are effective.
Choice and decision need not imply the absolutes of good health or a
complete balance of the emotional and intellectual capacities. Rather,
there has to be a sufficient balance so that one is not pushed or compelled
to behave in certain ways which often are against one's true will and
choice. It must also be recognized that the underlying capacities for involv-
ing oneself in difficult interpersonal decisions require an intact, intraper-
sonal maturity and soundness. Because one's behavior is strongly tied to
one's personality structure, the judgment of the psychiatrist comes not
only from the understanding of the development of the individual out of
his past, but also grows out of an understanding of the events which tran-
spired at the time such decisions or choices were made. Thus, one's behav-
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ior is often a revelation of one's underlying personality structure, and the
description of a personality category will allow us to predict and describe
an individual's behavior with some degree of accuracy.
While we know that many personality difficulties arise in early years,
it is clear that such tendencies become strengthened and fortified through
the yeais. If we can become clear about the individual's personality struc-
ture at the time we see him, we can make valid conjectures about what it
must have been in the past and therefore propose a diagnosis of what he
or she must have been like at the time the decision was made. Personalities
tend to become more rigid and fixed through the years. Consequently, we
are probably seeing a more extreme version of what the individual was like
many years ago. A compulsive pattern that is present today adds very
strong support to the proposition that it existed at an earlier time, proba-
bly including the time when the decision to marry was made. This re-
sponds to the question of how we can determine, long after an event, the
state of mind of the participants at the time a choice was made.
Such judgments are possible after reasonably short interviews if the
data are very strong and supportive. At times, however, there is sufficient
doubt and the judgment must be a questionable one. Nevertheless, the
presence of severely disturbed and distorted behavior, such as is present
in severe neurosis or psychosis, often gives us a firm grasp of the individ-
ual's functioning at the time of choice or decision. And this is equally true
if we are dealing with a character structure or personality disorder in which
the problem of choice and decision is equally great.
Since a neurosis or personality disorder becomes more severe as one
ages, it is reasonable to assume that it may have been minimal at the time
of the marriage. This would be true if experience and the intervention of
benevolent events did little to diminish the role of the neurosis in one's life,
but left it to exist in a subdued and adaptive way, producing less than the
expected disorganization. Thus, a neurotic process which is apparent years
after a marriage was entered into does not necessarily reflect the intensity
of its activity at an earlier time. It merely suggests that it must have been
present at that time. Only an examination of the intervening crises,
thwarts, benevolent successes, and failures will shed some light on whether
it got better or worse over the years. Nevertheless, as an index of the
severity of an individual's psychopathology, the ability to gather data
about his behavior at the time of the marriage is more significant than an
attempt to extrapolate on the earlier severity by the present day manifes-
tations.
RESPONSIBILITY-CoMMITMENT
In addition to the ability to make a mature and clear choice, one must
also consider the individual's ability to plan and conceptualize the signifi-
cance of a decision in terms of the future, a necessary part of this ability
being a responsible concern for fulfillment of this future. This requires a
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dimension of maturity additional to that of making a free choice, namely,
an emotional maturity to be able to acknowledge and be concerned with
the needs of the partner in terms of the future requirements of the contract.
Such long range capacities may be lacking in individuals even though the
ability to make a decision in the first instance may be valid. This issue
involves the range of love in a relationship and the regard for another
person as an object of care and consideration. In a mutual enterprise, it is
necessary to develop a full life of responsibile commitment to one's family
as individuals as well as to one's family as a unit with material needs. Only
when one is capable of some introspective ability to understand oneself is
it possible to understand the other party. This implies a capacity for love,
tender interest, and concern for another individual as well as a readiness
to share and an ability to pursue goals with a forthright decisiveness and
enthusiasm. It implies trust, dedication, loyalty, and a full commitment
to a shared life.
This situation is strikingly absent in those individuals we call socio-
paths. While capable of making a free choice as to whom they marry
(although often with fraudulent overtones), they are totally incapable of
pursuing future goals because of their marked narcissistic tendencies, their
lack of concern for anything but the fulfillment of their own immediate
needs, their inability to tolerate any frustrations, and their insistence upon
satisfying in a very egocentric way only their own requirements. They
demand a fulfillment unrestrained by limits of personal involvements or
the law, and, therefore, they frequently engage in illegal and outright anti-
social behavior. Finding no true loyalty and commitment in interpersonal
relations, they very quickly become involved in philandering relationships
with no concern for the welfare of the family. This is a perfect example of
the character disorder in which the capacity to make a decision may be
present, but the individual's capacity to fulfill the contract in the long run
is totally lacking.
It was suggested that a psychopathic or sociopathic personality may
be capable of a valid decision and free consent even though his capacity
to fulfill the contractual obligations may be grossly deficient. This is rarely
the case, however, since most decisions or commitments which they enter
into are tinged with fraudulent expectations and narcissistic requirements.
Their decisions are almost invariably conditional and egocentrically orien-
tated so there would be serious concern about their interpersonal integrity
and their awareness of the needs, desires, or interests of the others to whom
they are offering a contract, promise, or commitment. In this sense, they
would not be acting in a tender, interested, collaborative sense, nor would
they be treating their partners as a person rather than a thing. It would
almost entirely be "what they can get from a relationship rather than what
they can give to it."
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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN MARITAL SITUATIONS
The capacity for interpersonal relationships or the ability to love or
consider the needs of another individual are essential ingredients in the
fulfillment of a contractual relationship in which one accepts the other
person's need as a part of the contractual agreement. The conditions for
such mature interactions grow out of more than the intellectual under-
standing of the contractual obligations. They depend very heavily on the
individual's emotional capacity to become committed to another human
being in a true, tender, and total sense. This involves more than a capacity
for physical procreation and more than an ability to fulfill the material
needs of another. The act of procreation is a physical union and requires
only the possibility of the delivery of sperm to a woman who is capable of
mature ovulation. The capacity for interpersonal or emotional intimacy,
however, is something which grows only out of experience with others and
a development with warm parental figures, such growth allowing for sound
and mature judgment over the years. This implies self-esteem, a feeling of
self-worth, a capacity for understanding one's self and the needs of others,
and the ability to develop a knowledge of the other person's needs. This is
possible in the development of an individual when there has been neither
severe thwarts, nor impediments, nor psychic trauma, and thus mecha-
nisms of denial, rationalization, or other neurotic defenses are not re-
quired.
The capacity to love is never fully developed in anyone, but it is
sufficiently developed in most individuals so that there is a sharing, intrin-
sic to a good marital relationship, of all attitudes and experiences. This
capacity is often confused with infatuation or the early enthusiasms
brought on by severe needs of sex, dependency, or the like. If it is absent,
however, it is quickly noticed by a -marital partner and produces a variety
of disruptive events punctuating a stormy and inevitably alienated mar-
riage. It can be identified in those situations where the psychological, in
contrast to the chronological, immaturity was such that the individuals
had no real awareness of their proposed spouses until their denials, ideali-
zations, and unawarenesses suffered a serious blow as they began to notice
what their mate was really like. The immaturity also was reflected in their
inability to have any conception of what they were like themselves and in
their lack of awareness or capacity to observe their own needs, desires,
interests, and values. They were incapable of looking below the surface of
their mate's overt behavior and would overlook or deny all evidences of
behavior which foretold future disastrous personality traits. Their eager-
ness, impatience, or other neurotic needs required that they either bypass
all questionable behavior or assume that they will reform or undo such
tendencies. This is not love, but immaturity. Consequently, the narcissis-
tic or egocentric individual is overwhelmingly concerned with filling all his
needs and is incapable of sharing or relating to his partner's and children's
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requirements. This type of immaturity makes one incapable of interper-
sonal intimacy. Consequently, such marriages are barren, exploitative,
and without true collaborative intimacy.
Likewise the paranoid personality, who views the mate with suspicion,
distrust, and ever-present doubt with regard to fidelity, produces an end-
less preoccupation with reassurance and rigid conformity. Such a relation-
ship is totally lacking in mutual affection and communicative intimacy.
A valid relationship must have an interpersonal intimacy based on some
adequate intrapersonal maturity.
In these instances the validity of the contract is challenged by the
partner's incapacity, because of some personality tendencies, to fulfill the
marriage contract for a true sharing and for a tender involvement.
NEUROSIS, PSYCHOSIS, AND OTHER DIAGNOSTIC LABELLING
Historically, our understanding of the psychic functioning of an indi-
vidual was tied almost exclusively to his cognitive or intellectual capacity.
It was assumed that an individual whose intellectual development was
adequate could and should be able to understand and deal with the intrica-
cies of human functioning. In the last century, however, it has become
increasingly clear that emotional development, feelings, and attitudes play
a role in this functioning.
Nevertheless, the diagnostic categories which have been used through
these years did not necessarily reflect these advances. This is particularly
true in the broad labels of psychoses and neuroses which presumably had
specific and etiological significance. It was thought that the label of psy-
chosis implied a personality disorganization-determined by an individ-
ual's irrational and disturbed behavior-sufficient to severely impair the
ability to think, to communicate, and to interpret reality. This was partic-
ularly true in schizophrenia where delusions and hallucinations were pre-
sent and the individual's behavior was so aberrant, inappropriate, and
grossly irrational that there was little basis for disagreement about the
individual's ability to function, plan, or decide about his life. Psychosis
was contrasted with neurosis which was thought to be a less severe psycho-
logical disorganization in that there was no such gross personality disor-
ganization or misinterpretation of external reality. These were considered
to be minor psychic disorders which did not require hospitalization and
isolation from the general community.
In broad terms this understanding of psychosis and neurosis is valid.
By definition, a psychosis is a disorder in which the individual's capacity
to adapt to cultural requirements is lacking and where his behavior is
dangerous to himself and to others. In terms of some adaptive capacities,
however, neurotic developments may be more disruptive to some ego func-
tions. In the grosser disorganization of psychosis there may frequently be
large blocks or compartments of adequate functioning in which there is no
disturbance whatsoever. The neurotic, who appears to be less disturbed,
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may in fact be more disorganized and incapable of making decisions or of
carrying out responsibilities. In fact, in the area of interpersonal relation-
ships, he may be even more grossly disorganized than the psychotic. Con-
sequently, these labels are only indicative of certain qualities of behavior
which describe an individual's capacity to function outside of or only inside
of a hospital. And, the capacity for decision and choice may not be synony-
mous with these labels. It is evident and beyond dispute that certain
neuroses are much more disruptive of the capacity to function in an intel-
lectually and psychologically synthesized fashion than is a severe psychosis
in which only one portion of an individual's functioning is pathological
while the rest of his function is adequate. This relates to the use of defense
mechanisms, such as denial, compartmentalization, grandiosity, projec-
tion, and the like, which permit an individual to avoid manifesting his true
beliefs because of his conviction that he will be misunderstood. His dis-
dain, contempt, or asocial behavior rather than his psychotic feelings and
thought will be apparent.
The capacity to adjust and live in a community is not synonymous
with the capacity for mature and competent judgment. For example, a
very severe paranoid who can contain his paranoid thinking and keep it
out of his daily functioning can function very effectively in the community
and in the marriage. Yet he suffers from a severe psychosis in which schizo-
phrenia is the underlying disorder. Although incapable of making any valid
judgments about those matters which involve his paranoid thinking, he is
capable of making decisions about those which do not. On the other hand,
a hysterical individual who appears to be intact, even if melodramatic, and
who appears to be capable of remaining in a community because his behav-
ior in general is not psychotic may at times act so bizarrely and be so
disturbed that his entire functioning is disruptive. Therefore, he cannot
participate in true decisions about human relationships. Thus, in spite of
the labels, a neurosis may be more incapacitating and disorganizing of
one's daily functioning than a psychosis would be.
Neuroses can be described as disorders in which interpersonal rela-
tionships are most prominently disrupted. What has been said of a neu-
rosis-that it is possibly more incapacitating and disorganizing in one's
daily functioning than a psychosis-is also true with regard to compulsive
disorders in which severe compulsive individuals, in their precise and exag-
gerated need to be effective producers and performers, may appear in fact
to be functioning more adequately than others. Yet, they may be totally
incapable of making a free choice or decision since they are pushed by
psychological imperatives which do not allow them to deal with any of the
alternatives. This is due to their need for absolute guarantees and absolute
security in all of their functioning.
Personality disorders in general, where the capacity for loving inti-
macy in a mutual collaborative relationship is severely impaired, do inter-
fere with the proper concern, tolerance, and acceptance of others that is
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required in a marital arrangement. Consequently, diagnostic labels may be
very misleading and we must view the individual in terms of his total
behavior rather than in terms of some of his behavior's isolated elements.
Again, in the case of the personality disorders, certain areas of functioning
may be intact while others may be grossly disordered. This also applies to
compulsions as well as to psychotic paranoid delusions when these compul-
sions in particular areas of an individual's life may in fact not interfere
with his decisionmaking in other areas.
This issue is even more striking when we come to the category of
borderline states. This category is not fully accepted as a disease entity,
but simply implies that certain behavioral characteristics border on more
severe disruptive states. Borderline behavior may itself be very maladap-
tive, even though it is not yet psychotic. Thus, it often refers to latent
prepsychotic behavior, and receives a special name only because certain
techniques for treatment are more applicable to an individual before he
becomes psychotic than when he passes over the borderline. This category
is now becoming more prominent in the sense that we are dealing with
symptoms and behavior that are difficult to classify as psychotic. The
symptoms can shift from one pattern to another, and the individual may
be acting out behavior which will ultimately be schizophrenic. Such diag-
nostic labels can be misleading in our exploration of the individual's capac-
ity for valid choice and for carrying out decisions since it is not the label
of where he stands in the spectrum of psychosis which is relevant, but our
assessment of his psychic integrity to make and to pursue a valid choice.
Labels may have only tangential relevance to an individual's ability to
make valid choices. This is particularly true when such choices involve
long term relationships which require more than intellectual or physical
capacity for their consummation. Marriages must involve the ability to
understand and to take into account the needs of the partners. The total
behavior of an individual reveals his ability to be aware of his own as well
as his partner's needs, and such a capacity derives from the growth or
maturity of his interpersonal relatedness as well as his intellectual capac-
ity.
Labels have no universal significance. In fact, intellectual capacities
are not sufficient since they also may vary in different parts of the world.
Strikingly, such is the case with regard to the label of hysteria. Only a short
while ago, hysteria was, and in some parts of the world still is, considered
a major disorder. In the United States, however, it is considered a minor
illness. We must therefore emphasize the totality of an individual's behav-
ior rather than use a label which implies a defect that may not be present
in each instance. We must also distinguish between symptoms that charac-
terize a disorder and the necessary presence of the disorder. If we note a
particular tendency or behavioral item, we must be able to recognize it as
part of a total personality constellation rather than as an isolated pheno-
menon which will occur under specific circumstances. It is a character
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structure defect that may involve failure to choose validly or to fulfill
responsibilities of concern and care for another person, rather than isolated
issues of irresponsibility, drinking, selfishness, etc., that allows us to make
inferences about past behavior. We must, to speak of a personality disor-
der, be able to demonstrate clusters of characteristics that are part of a
particular character type. Such behavior must be consistent, persistent,
and occur under circumstances with rigid and unyielding tenacity. Person-
ality traits react indiscriminately and compulsively regardless of the per-
son or the occasion. This can be demonstrated, for example, in a narcissis-
tic or an egocentric personality disorder where the needs of the other can-
not be assessed or fulfilled because of the total focus on one's own needs
and desires. Likewise, the sociopathic personality makes it impossible for
the individual to have any realistic concern for others because of the gran-
diose assumption that he is privileged and exempt from human compas-
sion and sharing.
Severe egocentricity does not permit a person to function satisfactorily
with another. Thus, the capacity for sustaining full, loving, and effective
relationships is severely impaired. Consequently, we must acknowledge
that it is not the label which determines validity. A paranoid who may be
schizophrenic may in fact sustain a meaningful relationship over many
years of marriage and carry out the formal requirements of marriage even
though he may not be capable of a full exchange of love and tenderness.
In contrast, a severe compulsive cannot make a free choice and therefore
his commitments are always conditional and there is rarely ever a true
interaction of marriage. It is only through an examination of an individual
who comprehends the significance of maturity and development that such
judgments as to the validity of a contract, whether involving human or
purely material interactions, can be effectively made.
If we agree that the marriage should be annulled on the grounds of
psychopathological immaturity or personality disorder, how can we expect
a subsequent marriage to succeed? In fact, since second marriages rarely
appear for subsequent annulment, it may be inferred that subsequent
marriages frequently do succeed. The question is based on a misunder-
standing of the nature of neurosis or personality disorder. It is not a fixed,
immutable tendency beyond repair or correction. In fact, the experience
in the first marriage is often a significant learning experience and the
therapeutic effectiveness of the Tribunal procedure plays a significant role
in choosing a better suited mate and entering a more respectful, loving,
collaborative marriage. The examination of the individual's personality
configuration or behavior which prevented self-awareness and therefore
awareness of the partner is revealed and acknowledged and often respected
in the subsequent marriage. Recognition of the role of free choice, responsi-
bility, love, care, exchange, and trust is highlighted so that subsequent
marriages have more interpersonal validity. The Tribunal procedure often
serves to focus on issues of which the partners may have had little or no
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awareness. In this sense, the Tribunal plays a reparative as well as a
sacramental role and reunites and makes "whole" those disturbed and
distressed partners.
In addition it may be borne in mind that personality and mental
functioning is a relative incapacity. Although traits may be very antagonis-
tic to each other, they may also be conjunctive and symbiotic. The hysteri-
cal individual may live very happily and tenderly with an obsessional even
though he would be totally incompatible with another hysteric. A schizoid
individual may marry well with a more subdued, passive individual, yet
be utterly incapable of sustaining a relationship with a manic, excessively
extroverted individual. Thus, annulments involving such personality mis-
fits may be the prelude to successful marriages with other personality
types. In this way the Tribunal serves to fulfill the best capacities and
potentialities of an individual and allows him a more reasonable and valid
choice for a full and total existence.
While psychiatric labels can be useful in describing broad categories
of human behavior and pathology, they tend towards an uncritical ap-
praisal of a particular individual's behavior and potential. To discard la-
belling we must be prepared to substitute in its place adequate and con-
vincing data with regard to such issues as judgmental capacity, adequate
consent, responsibility, interpersonal intimacy, and benevolent collabora-
tion. To replace the psychiatric opinion of schizophrenia one must present
data to highlight, among other things, the individual's inclination toward
withdrawal, the splitting of emotion from intellect, and the disorganization
of the individual's capacity for effective and rational functioning. Thus,
when we advocate fewer labels, we must be able to supply data.
This leads us directly to the question of the function and propriety of
the psychiatrist's presence during the Tribunal proceeding. It is the direct
contact with the individuals involved rather than transcripts of the pro-
ceedings that lends conviction to the proceedings and comfort and support
to the participants. It is the presence of a trained interviewer whose goal
is to elucidate character structure, its development, and its malfunctioning
that makes the psychiatrist an invaluable member of the team whose
function is to determine the validity of the marital contract. The
psychiatrist, through his informed questioning, not only supplies the court
with positive evidence, but also assists the defender of the bond in eluci-
dating and illuminating the inconsistencies and ambiguities that might
lead the court to difficulties in arriving at a just judgment, be it affirmative
or negative.
Rather than a standard or routine set of questions, the judges and the
defender of the bond can pursue lines of inquiry opened up by a competent
psychiatric consultant. This inquiry can be convincing to them and to any
appellate body as well as to all of the participants in the annulment pro-
ceeding. The presence of the psychiatrist can also accelerate the proceed-
ings immeasurably and thereby save the Tribunal, the Church, and the
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applicants both money and anguish. It is an economy, not a luxury, and a
positive contribution to the faith, good will, and loving concern of the
participants.
ADDENDA: COMMENTS ON "COMMITMENT TO AND IN
MARRIAGE"
ROBERT M. DALY, M.D.**
Dr. Salzman describes two parts to the marriage contract as if they
were truly separate. The initial part requires a free will act and the second
part requires an ability to understand the future evolution of the interper-
sonal relationship. This division of the contract into two separate acts is
purely descriptive. The free will act is to marry this person based on the
actual knowledge of the other person as a "human being." As described
by Rollo May, the full meaning of the term "human being" will be clearer
if the reader keeps in mind that "being" is a participle, a real form imply-
ing that someone is in the process of being something. Being is constantly
emerging, i.e. it is always in the process of becoming, always developing
in time, and never to be defined at status points. In order to have knowl-
edge of another person, we must experience the other person's being. It is
at this point that a free will act is made and the contract formed.
The future is present. I will venture to say that because of the high
incidence of personality disorders in the United States, the free will act is
unable to be made in a high percentage of Catholic marriages. I also feel
that in many other instances, either because of developmental immaturity
or as a result of the complex emotional factors involved in courting, the
free will act occurs a long time after the words "I do" are said on the altar.
I agree with Dr. Salzman that this decision does not need to imply the
absolutes of good health or a complete balance of the emotional and intel-
lectual capacities. But there has to be sufficient balance so that one's acts
are not predetermined by conditioning or anxiety avoidance factors as
exemplified by definition by the personality disorders.
I generally agree with the statement that a personality disorder be-
comes more severe as one gets older and that the possibility of it being
minimal at the time of the marriage is a normal assumption. I disagree
with the implication that a free will act has a greater possibility of occur-
ring at the time of the marriage. This is because I interpret his word severe
to mean that the personality disorder is more permanent and less treat-
** Deputy Commissioner of Mental Health and Retardation for the City of New York;
psychiatric consultant to the Tribunal of the Diocese of Brooklyn.
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able. The inability to make a free will act, marriage, is the same in both
cases.
I disagree with the statement that a sociopath is capable of making a
free choice as to whom to marry. In addition to what was explained earlier,
Dr. Salzman's statement that personality traits react indiscriminately and
compulsively regardless of the person or the occasion adds support to this.
I therefore cannot agree with the implication that a paranoid schizophrenic
can enter into an "I - thou," i.e. meaningful, relationship.
MARION JUSTIN REINHARDT***
The distinction made by Dr. Salzman between judgmental capacity
and adequately free consent, on the one hand, and the ability to fulfill an
essential term of the marriage contract, on the other hand, gives a possible
answer to a question frequently proposed by canonists today: is psychic
impotence absolute so that the nullity is envisioned as being unilateral, i.e.
solely on the one person, or is it relative, i.e. an incapacity which depends
on the relationship of one person to another, so that a person would be
considered incapable of entering marriage with one specific person but
could marry another? Dr. Salzman describes the incapacity to fulfill an
essential term of the contract, i.e. to lead a common conjugal life, as
described by canon 1128, as relative. A person may not be able to lead a
common conjugal life with one person, but he may be able to do so with
another. Canonists are already accustomed to a relative incapacity to ful-
fill an essential term of the marriage contract such as is mentioned in
canon 1068. On the other hand, severe interference with judgmental capac-
ity, lack of internal freedom, or inadequate consent would be unilateral.
The consent could be defective on both parties, but at least in one the
judgmental capacity, the freedom of the will, or the consent in general
would have to be severely interfered with. However, at least in some cases,
consent which was severely defective at one point in history (the day of a
marriage) might be truly adequate at another time in history (the day of
the second marriage).
This concept is also well known to canonists. A person who completely
lacked internal freedom at the time of a first marriage because of fear
caused by grave, external, unjust force might enjoy almost perfect freedom
at the time of a second marriage.
*** S.T.B., Gregorian University, Rome, 1939; J.C.D., Catholic University of America,
1949; LL.B., St. John's University, 1963. Presiding and Administrative Judge of the Diocese
of Brooklyn.
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EDWARD J. KOMORA, J.C. ****
A man and a woman in a covenant of conjugal love, i.e. of marriage,
agree to render help and service to each other through an intimate union
of their persons and their actions. They agree to a perpetual and exclusive
bodily right ordained to acts which are per se apt for the procreation of
children. They agree to a partnership, i.e. to a community of life which is
the intimate union of each other's person and works. Conjugal life thus
consists of an interpersonal ordination. This ordination to which the par-
ties are committing themselves and are contracting for is not only a right
to community opportune for procreative acts, but is especially for the right
also to the community of life opportune for sharing all the facilities of
living of which they are capable. The commitment is a consent or
willingness to activate not only each other's potentiality for procreative
acts, but to activate as well a potentiality for a felicitous sharing of a
totality of living other than that for acts of procreation.
Thus, it can be seen that a consent to marriage must contain more
than a simple, abstract, concept of the content of the objective substance
of marriage, a simple volitional assertion of "I do."
Thus, the intellectual cognitive capacity to understand the nature of
marriage, proclaimed as the essential requisite for making a marital con-
sent and hitherto cited as a guarantee of that consent's validity, is not
really a truly operational capacity unless it also comprehends awareness
and preparedness for coping with all the multiple contingencies attendant
on the marriage's extending into the future. But, more than this, genuine
human (humanus) authenticity of this essential intellectual cognitive ca-
pacity regarding its fitness for consent to marriage must be seated in a
maturated fullness of that element of human reality designated as the life
of the emotions, the vis affectiva, or the instinctual drive apperceptions
and their appropriate orientation to the external reality of persons and
things. The valid consent implies that it is predicated on an ability for the
capacity of the contractant to evaluate in concrete, visualized images,
foresights and in repeated states or ways of prescience what a totality of
community living is and capacity to judge whether this or that other per-
son is equal to and suitable for adequately participating in these prospec-
tive vistas of community living envisioned by the contractant or not.
Consenting to a marriage, then, is in large part a judgment about
oneself as to whether capacities for community living are present; what
these capacities are, i.e. what is their mental and physical substance, and
to what sufficient degree are these same capacities present and congruous
in the person contemplated as that other one involved in the prospective
interpersonal relationship. Further, a certain accuracy and objective real-
ity must be an essential part of a contractant's knowledgeable self-
****Psychiatric consultant to the Tribunal of the Diocese of Brooklyn.
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possession since it necessarily becomes the touchstone of his or her evalua-
tion of the other partner. We know, interpret, and understand another in
the light of how we have known and experienced ourselves. An individual
who is unconscious to his own dynamic ratiocinations of living and
experiencing cannot properly understand and judge the person he is drawn
to.
The complete nature, then, of that very essential capacity, namely
maturitas judicii, is a nature which is homogeneous or integral with a
maturitas affectiva. Good or adequate requisite judgment refers, then, to
both intellectual and emotional functions. More correctly, one would say
that it refers to the emotionally relevant use of one's assets in regard to
the reality situation, in this case marriage, where though intellectual and
logical correctness is implied, they do not play the only role; rather it is
the proper emotional orientation which brings to consciousness and to
execution the efficient utilization of one's knowledge in a manner attuned
to the whole situation. Further, it implies a delaying of first impulses and
implies an enumeration of discrepant possibilities.
The foregoing formulations are in fair part culled from recent Rotal
decisions and, together with the rest, are consonant with a good deal of
prevailing psychiatric theory and are resonant with the discoveries of per-
sonality development and sound personality structure emerging from the
findings of depth psychology.
In pursuance of the present discussion regarding the needs of Tribu-
nals in their evaluation of pleadings for nullity, there is some pertinence
in first citing a Rotal commentary incident to one of its most recent deci-
sions. The commentary states that it is "difficult in the existential order
and with words that could be terms positive and adequate to explain what
are the essential formal elements of the partnership of the whole of life, as
long as the parties in the act of celebrating marriage mutually give to one
another the right to that partnership and likewise accept it." The parties
alluded to in this obiter dictum are, of course, not the parties who appear
before marriage tribunals. They are, rather, those partners in marriage who
have been living together for a brief or lengthy time in an atmosphere of
friction and antagonism, ignoring or being oblivious to each other's wishes
for joy, comfort, or enrichment, and are aggressive, abusive, grossly ne-
glectful of each other, and often openly hostile and explicitly rejecting of
each other, their lives being devoid of any affective expressions of love or
concern, erotic or otherwise.
It is the business of the Tribunal to discover whether this negative
disruptive state of what was once ostensibly designed and intended as a
relation of conjugal love and entered into by way of a marital consent is
the result of malicious, explicit, designedly vicious intention correctable
only by grace and moral reformation or whether it is the result of some
condition of psychopathology not only presently existing in the contractant
but intrinsic to the personality of the contractant or contractants and
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visibly discernible as they presented themselves at the time of marital
consent. It is in instances like these, i.e. instances of actual marital discord
analogous or similar to the descriptions given above, that Tribunals have
appealed to psychiatric knowledge and science for helpful evaluation. And
it is also the offering of psychiatry and psychiatrists to demonstrate that
it is not entirely so difficult to explain what are the essential components
of this partnership of the whole of life.
Thus in very many such instances psychiatric opinions based on the
discoveries and insights gathered from the explorations of depth psychol-
ogy find that there existed in at least one, if not both, contractants a
definite type of psychopathology depriving the contractant of the ability
to make a valid judicious consent commensurate with the natural sub-
stance of the marital relationship.
It is in such cases as these that psychiatric opinion would be to the
effect that there existed a disorder of the personality, though not necessar-
ily marked by florid features of delusions, hallucinations, irresistible im-
pulses, or blatant obsessions or compulsions, but still severe enough to
preclude the development of the essential community of life necessary for
marriage. Psychiatric opinions would state that there was a failure in
development of the capacity for object relationships, i.e. attraction to-
wards an object by affective movements had not been determined by an
appreciative comprehension of the object. It would explain also that what-
ever comprehension of the object that occurred had not been the result of
trial-like identifications of the contractant with the object's own feelings
and strivings during courtship and therefore could not truly have realized
that essential phenomenon of empathic joy, which is the natural epigenesis
of such trial identifications and is in great part the substance of object love.
Psychiatry would be able to demonstrate that the contractant had not
been able to grasp the fact that satisfaction accruing from a unity with the
presumed love object can only exist if the love object, too, is satisfied in
the contextual ambiance of mutual perceptions and sensibilities, tastes,
values, aspirations, and ambitions. It would state that the contractant's
interpersonal behavior was always motivated instead by a quest for confir-
mation of self-esteem, self-respect, self-value, self-importance-all variant
expressions of the crucial failure in psychic development, namely that
normal transmutation of primal narcissism into constructive reality-
directed tendencies and patterns essential for an emotional and intellec-
tual life normally enriched by participation in a conjugal relationship. In
more simple terms, the pattern of disruptive behavior which is exhibited
by this type of personality can be described by saying that in the conscious-
ness of the contractant there was never an awareness of why he really
believed he loved the partner since he never found out whether the partner
loved him for what he loved about himself and never knew whether he
loved the partner for what the partner loved about herself. In other words,
the persistence of the primal, untransmuted, untamed narcissism-which
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is initially intrinsic to all personalities-precluded his thinking that any-
one could have equal, let alone more, importance or that attention to the
self-evaluation or self-concept existing in another was of any significance
for marital compatibility.
It is this type of individual which falls into the category of personality
disorders which of recent years has been termed narcissistic personality
disorder. The label is appropriate, but the label is not the substance of the
disorder. The manifestations of the disorder, however, are distinct and the
essence of the disorder, namely a maldeveloped narcissism, is a real psy-
chological phenomenon or essence. As stated earlier, the behavioral pat-
tern is not attributable to absence of virtuous tendencies alone, but to
intrinsic defective structuring of the personality.
What has been said is an attempt to show that the category of person-
ality disorder signifies a genuine bona fide example of a psychological state
which is incompatible with actuating the true substantial content of mar-
riage and as such seriously impairs the ability to exercise the res judicii
necessary to negotiate a valid marital contract. It is also an attempt to
show that the evaluation of a contractant's longitudinal as well as present
vertical behavioral pattern must be geared for illucidation of the personal-
ity structure and such deviant facets as the examination discloses must be
estimated in terms of their relevance to the structure of the personality.
The balance of ego or intellectual capacity, instinctual energy or vis
affectiva, parental introjects functioning as norms for the use of affects and
instincts to help conscience, valuations of external phenomena or reality
testing capacity, and finally, a coherent sense of self, all help to determine
a contractant's capacity for felicitous, productive, enriching living. All
manifestations of psychic pathology or deviation ought to be evaluated in
terms of their weight in determining personality structure insofar as the
personality structure militates for or against conjugal existence. These
deviations may be florid or blatant and obviously, in such cases, are pre-
clusive of conjugal living. When they are seemingly vague and indeter-
mined, however, analysis of the contractants in terms of personality struc-
ture is imperative.
Rotal decisions have said that when a person is incapable of rightly
judging and reasoning about starting this community of lasting life with
another person, then ipso facto he lacks that discretion of judgment which
can lead to a valid choice of a conjugal partner. Further, these decisions
have said that a marital state entered upon by such an individual could
not result in the product of a consortium omnis vitae and nullity therefore
ensues on the lack of what is the very object of the matrimonial consent.
It is well to repeat what was said above, namely, that when the find-
ings of the behavior of a contractant are seemingly vague and indetermi-
nate, then it will greatly aid to determine and delineate whether or not the
personality is intact enough for valid marital consent.
